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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Climate change has a disproportionate effect in
the Caribbean due to the region’s vulnerabilities
as a collection of Small Island Developing States.
Caribbean smallness and geographic location
mean that the effects of climate change occur
in three forms—sudden onset disasters, slow
onset events, and the intersection of both. The
first form are events, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, flash floods, etc. Slow onset events occur over longer periods and include rising sea
levels and temperatures, forest degradation,
and ocean acidification. The most destructive
form is the third. Slow onset events destroy the
natural barriers that protect infrastructure and
populations from sudden onset disasters. For
instance, rising temperatures and soil erosion
limit the natural absorption of rainfall, causing
more devastating flooding. In addition, climate
change effects an array of areas. It creates water scarcity in the Eastern Caribbean, food insecurity across the region, and presents challenges to energy grids. Also, sudden and slow
onset events cause damage to infrastructure
and contribute to severe economic contraction.
Along with climate change challenges, there is
existing and growing security risks in the Caribbean. The proliferation of organized crime
groups, gang violence, narco-trafficking, border
controversies, and common crimes are among
the region’s contemporary challenges. Several
Caribbean countries have high homicide rates
relative to the rest of the Americas. As a transit hub for transnational criminal groups, illegal
arms and drug flows permeate the region.
The impacts of climate change on security
challenges in the Caribbean creates cyclical or
recurrent risk for the region. The effects of climate change, in its three forms, damages infrastructure, limits access to social services,
and disrupts the provision of public, private,
and common goods. When this occurs, Caribbean governments need to mobilize resources
to provide these goods, services, and rebuild
infrastructure. The resources used is taken
from investments in other economic sectors
or is sourced through development loans and
financing from international financial institutions. The challenge is that Caribbean governments are debt-burdened, making them hesitant to incur additional debt, and resources in
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other economic and public sectors are often
already insufficient. As Caribbean governments
build back, extant security challenges continue
to grow as funds are deprioritized from security
forces, education, health, and others. As goods
and services are limited, frustrations among
populations grow and existing organized crime
groups become replacements for some local and national governments. As employment
decreases, memberships of organized crime
groups grow as well. The result is that Caribbean governments’ ability to combat security
challenges dwindles, all while more climate disasters and events occur year-round.
The cyclical risk that the intersection of climate
change and security presents for the Caribbean
is creating a new, dual role for the region’s militaries. Security forces will contend with traditional security challenges and be responsible for
providing humanitarian assistance and disaster
response in the aftermath of climate events.
The dual role puts a strain on already-limited
personnel, funds, and expertise. These limitations will grow as the scope and intensity of security and climate challenges increase.
Further, the intersection of climate change and
security risks in the Caribbean adds to complex
geopolitical dynamics. China has increased its
financing for Caribbean renewable energy projects and frequently provides disaster assistance after climate disasters. In addition, some
countries benefit from Venezuelan assistance
after hurricanes, which affects different relationships with Caribbean states that still recognize Nicolás Maduro.
Resilient recovery, access to low-interest financing, expansion of the regional security system,
and enhancing military-to-military coordination
between the United States and the Caribbean
would help the region address current and forthcoming challenges. Needed climate-resilient infrastructure requires significant financing. But
debt-burdened Caribbean economies cannot
afford it, which is why access to low-interest
financing is key. Also, regional security cooperation helps alleviate pressures from Caribbean
countries facing the brunt of climate and security risks. And the knowledge and expertise that
aids in disaster preparedness, humanitarian relief, and combatting transnational crime can be
learned and shared between US Southern Command and Caribbean security forces.
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INTRODUCTION
The Caribbean, particularly the members of the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM),1 are among
the most vulnerable to the effects of climate
change. The region sits in the Atlantic Ocean,
putting it in the path of most hurricanes and
tropical storms that develop during the summer
months. Moreover, most Caribbean states are
low-lying islands, with large segments of the
populations located on the coasts, leaving them
susceptible to flooding and rising sea levels. In
addition, CARICOM members are dependent on
tourism or agricultural and natural resource exports, meaning the ebbs and flows of international markets and prices due to climate events
have disproportionate effects at home.
Caribbean states, which are globally categorized as Small Island Developing States (SIDS),
have similar characteristics and challenges. On
average, they have Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZ) that are 28 times larger than their landmass, collectively hold less than 1 percent of
the world’s population, and depend on the international system for development and sustainability.2 Therefore, their challenges are often
the same. As natural disasters strike Caribbean
countries, unemployment and poverty increase,
as does dependence on the international system for recovery and resilience, such as new
loans for the already indebted region.
The Caribbean is also home to security challenges. The region is a natural transit hub as
it borders the United States and Latin America,
and many of the countries have porous borders,
allowing for freer movement of illicit goods, people, and arms. Due to stifled development and
limited security forces, homicide rates and gang
proliferation are on the rise, and the region is
frequently used for human and drug trafficking.
At the same time, the region is linguistically,
culturally, and geographically diverse, with the
latter most important for understanding how
climate change impacts the various Caribbean states. CARICOM members range from Antigua and Barbuda in the Eastern Caribbean,
Belize in Central America, Guyana situated between Venezuela and Brazil in South America,
and The Bahamas to the east of Florida. This
means that although Caribbean countries, due
to their geographic location and smallness, ex-

perience climate change similarly, the climate
events they face are distinct of one another.
The diversity is a particular policy challenge at
the regional level. Countries in the Southern Caribbean, particularly Guyana and Suriname, do
not experience hurricanes and tropical storms,
although this differs for The Bahamas and the
Eastern Caribbean. Haiti and Jamaica are at risk
for major earthquakes, while St. Vincent and the
Grenadines experienced a devastating volcanic
eruption in 2021.3
The combination of security risk and vulnerability to climate change places the Caribbean—along with the region’s security forces—in
a precarious position. The effects of climate
change limit Caribbean governments’ resources to address current security challenges, such
as gang proliferation, organized crime, and drug
and arms trafficking. It also causes severe economic contraction and increases unemployment, poverty, and inequality, all of which incentivizes more people to turn to illicit activities
to secure their livelihoods. In addition, climate
change decreases access to public and common goods, creating spaces of competition and
potential conflict. Therefore, climate change is
frequently regarded as a threat multiplier. However, the intersection of climate change and
security challenges should be categorized as a
cyclical or recurrent risk to make it more applicable to the Caribbean’s current and future
circumstances. At the same time, the role of
Caribbean security forces will change, placing
many of them in new, uncomfortable positions.
Caribbean militaries will have to adapt to a new,
dual function, balancing disaster resistance and
rapid response with rising domestic and external security risks. Consequently, security officials should be involved in government planning
regarding climate crisis response, adding a new
layer to civil-military relations. But as security
conditions worsen due to climate change, Caribbean militaries will become more involved
in domestic affairs, as is the case in Jamaica,
where there is a strong gang presence. More
crossover from national defense to domestic
situations could usher in a new age of gang interactions with security forces, putting civilians
at risk.
The Caribbean’s proximity to the United States
means that what affects the former often has
implications for the latter. In this case, increased security challenges in the Caribbean

4

would affect U.S. interests and national security, especially as climate change amplifies and
strengthens these challenges. Transnational
criminal groups that gain more of a foothold
in the Caribbean due to increased poverty and
unemployment can counter the ability of the region’s security forces to protect the rule of law
and citizen livelihoods. As narcotics and arms
proliferation continue, more gangs and organized crime would further affect U.S. national
security, as would displacement from poverty
and natural disasters, meaning increased migration to U.S. shores.
At a broader level, the intersection of climate
change and security has geopolitical considerations for Caribbean countries and the United
States. Addressing climate change through recovery, resilience, and adaptation requires significant financing. In an indebted region, most
governments will look elsewhere before agreeing to accept new loans from international financial institutions. Caribbean decision-makers
are pragmatic actors, meaning there are opportunities for U.S. counterparts, such as China
and Russia, to strengthen diplomatic ties by offering aid or low-interest loans to governments
and others on a smaller scale, such as Venezuela and Cuba.

CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE
CARIBBEAN
The effects of climate change in the Caribbean
tend to occur in three forms: (1) sudden onset
disasters, (2) slow onset, and (3) the intersection between the two. Sudden onset forms are
typically the climate events that grip headlines,
such as hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, and flooding, while slow onset forms
occur over longer periods, including rising sea
levels, rising temperatures, forest degradation,
and ocean acidification. Each form presents a
significant risk to the region, but the combination of sudden and slow onset disasters offers a
unique and grim outlook for the Caribbean’s future. Slow onset events either turn into sudden
onset events or increase the state’s vulnerability to the latter. Rising sea levels that contribute to coastal erosion limit natural protection
against storm surges, and rising temperatures
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and desertification slowly cause soil erosion,
which increases the likelihood of flooding after
heavy rainfall. In sum, slow onset events reduce
the natural environment’s ability to organically
protect livelihoods against sudden onset disasters.
Water scarcity: Although surrounded by water,
many Caribbean states are considered or are on
the verge of becoming water-scarce nations.4
For example, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados,
St. Kitts and Nevis, and The Bahamas rely on
groundwater as sources of freshwater. These
resources are typically replenished by rainfall,
meaning that droughts and changes in precipitation patterns alter freshwater availability,
leaving governments and citizenry with limited access to clean water, depending on the
climate. The sixth assessment of the climate
change report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change indicated that small Caribbean islands are likely to see decreased rainfall
and increased droughts over the next few decades, putting more states at risk of becoming
water-scarce nations.5 Freshwater is essential
to the societal and economic functioning of
Caribbean states; it is integral for consumption
and the production of agricultural products. For
states with existing reservoirs but low-lying
coasts, a rise in sea level increases salination,
further compromising water systems. At the
same time, water infrastructure in the Caribbean
is at risk. Sudden and slow onset climate disasters compromise the integrity of water systems.
Strong storms and high winds damage existing
water infrastructure, which could cut water access to local populations. After Hurricane Maria,
almost half of the small water systems in Puerto
Rico suffered significant operational challenges
due to damaged water pipes and distribution
lines.6
Food insecurity: The effects of climate change
threaten to exacerbate the challenges for an
already food-insecure region. For the broader
Caribbean, more than 80 percent of the region’s
food is imported, demonstrating a heavy dependence on international markets.7 Droughts and
global agricultural degradation, which stem the
flow of food products to the Caribbean, limit the
ability of governments to secure food for their
populations. At the same time, unemployment
and poverty caused by agricultural degradation,
hurricanes, and declining fisheries decrease the
purchasing power of citizens, forcing them to
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cut down on food consumption. Climate change
also affects food procurement within the Caribbean due to declining fisheries and damage to
fishing equipment. Sudden onset events damage fishing gear and fishing vessels, impairing
the ability of local fishers to source food and
thus, hinders their employment. And slow onset
events, such as ocean acidification and dying
coral reefs, are causing substantial declines in
fishing populations. According to the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
annual catch rates have declined in the Caribbean by 25 percent since the 1990s.8
Economic decline and unemployment: The
economies of Caribbean states are small and
open, often dependent on tourism and the agricultural or fishing sector. Sudden and slow onset
events affect both sectors, contributing to economic contraction and unemployment across
the region. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, 10 of the top 20 tourism-dependent economies globally are CARICOM members.9 When natural disasters like hurricanes
and tropical storms reach Caribbean shores,
tourism, a main source of revenue, is halted. For
instance, the World Travel and Tourism Council
noted that the 2017 hurricane season generated an estimated loss of US$741 million due to
tourism declines, affecting 11,005 jobs across
the region.10 Furthermore, while a small factor
of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Eastern Caribbean countries, the agricultural sector
plays a large role in Haiti, Guyana, Suriname,
and Dominica, contributing between 12 to 17
percent.11 Beyond its contributions to GDP, for
some—especially in the Southern Caribbean—
it is linked to almost 25 percent employment.
Declining fisheries due to climate change affect
employment. As of 2014, at least 64,000 people
in CARICOM countries are employed by smallscale fisheries, and 180,000 are involved in fish
processing.12
Challenges to energy: As the effects of climate
change worsen, challenges to the Caribbean’s
energy security will increase. During intense
storms in the hurricane season, energy infrastructure, such as power plants, is routinely
damaged, leaving parts of Caribbean countries
without power for days or even weeks. These
blackouts increase panic among the populace
and, depending on response time, can raise
questions about the legitimacy of certain leaders. Besides Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago,

the Caribbean is dependent on energy imports
from abroad, resulting in a high cost for electricity. This has forced Caribbean governments
to look toward renewable energy as a method
of lowering energy costs and increasing resilience. But the impact of climate change limits
governments’ ability to turn to some renewable
energies, such as hydropower. Droughts and
limited rainfall affect hydropower output, and
for countries in the Eastern Caribbean, smaller
islands might not have enough available land to
generate necessary energy. For instance, during
the 2009-2010 drought in the Caribbean, hydropower contribution to electricity production
in St. Vincent fell from 28.1 percent in 2008 to
8.2 percent in 2010.13 The result is a continued
overreliance on other forms of energy, such as
oil, of which Eastern Caribbean states are import-dependent.
Infrastructure: Broadly, infrastructure is at
risk in the Caribbean due to both sudden and
slow onset climate events. Homes and government buildings are destroyed, immediately
contributing to displacement, poverty, and longer government response time. For instance,
when Hurricane Maria hit Dominica in 2018, it
damaged 90 percent of the island’s structures
and 62 percent of homes, leaving 35 percent of
those families displaced.14 Roads and bridges,
essential for delivering public goods and disaster relief after strong storms, are usually compromised. In the aftermath of Hurricane Maria,
roads and bridges were flooded, destroyed,
or blocked by debris. Beyond hurricanes, slow
onset events, such as rising sea levels and
coastal erosion, pose risks to the Caribbean,
whose country capitals are mostly located on
the coasts, which tend to house higher concentrations of the population. According to an
Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean study, more than 50 percent of the
Caribbean’s population live within 1.5 kilometers of the shore.15 Thus, as the sea level escalates and flooding becomes more likely, large
segments of Caribbean people will be affected,
lose livelihoods, and migrate.
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CURRENT SECURITY
CHALLENGES
Although considered a relatively stable region,
the security risk in the Caribbean at the domestic and regional levels is increasing. Common crimes, gang violence and kidnappings,
narco-trafficking, border disputes, and mass
migration are among the region’s contemporary
security challenges. In addition, many of these
challenges do not occur independently of each
other but are often compounded or contribute
to additional security risks. For example, mass
migration across the region, especially after
natural disasters, increases the susceptibility
that people will fall victim to human trafficking
or, if they are without sources of income, will
join organized crime groups. In Jamaica, those
most at-risk of joining gangs come from socioeconomically challenged communities and
those unemployed in the formal sector.16 In
addition, border controversies between Caribbean countries or with Latin American neighbors provoke nationalist sentiment; when this
is combined with competition for public goods
or natural resources, the probability of conflict
increases. For instance, due to Guyana’s oil reserves, Venezuela detained and intercepted
several Guyanese fishing and naval vessels in
2013, 2018, and 2021.17
Common crimes and homicides are among the
most worrisome security challenges in the Caribbean. According to InSight Crime, Jamaica
had the highest homicide rate in Latin America
and the Caribbean at 46.5 per 100,000 people, with Trinidad and Tobago (28.2) and Belize
(24.3) not far behind.18 And although Barbados
is not near the top of the list, its homicide rate
has more than doubled since 2012.19 In the first
half of 2021, Haiti has seen a rise in homicides
and kidnappings.20 In Jamaica and Haiti, violent crimes are driven by gang proliferation and
the availability of guns. From 2008 to 2018, 56
percent of murders in Jamaica resulted from
gang-related violence, with this number peaking
at 78 percent in 2013.21 From 2010 to 2018, the
number of gangs in Jamaica increased from 191
to 381,22 and as of 2021, there are more than 90
gangs in Haiti.23 And these gangs, particularly in
Jamaica, are fueled by the flow of illegal guns
that enter the country, mainly from the United
States. According to The New York Times, Ja-
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maican authorities commented that, on average, 200 guns a month are illegally smuggled
into Jamaica.24
Caribbean countries’ porous borders and geographic location have primed the region as
a transit hub for drugs, arms, and people. InSight Crime has documented the rise in gun
and drug smuggling between Caribbean countries, particularly between Jamaica and Haiti.25
The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
highlights that Jamaica is the largest marijuana supplier to its Caribbean neighbors and that
Colombian transnational criminal organizations
use Caribbean nations to ship heroin and cocaine to the United States.26 In 2020, Guyana
was linked to “the largest overseas drug bust
ever, worldwide” after 11.5 tons of cocaine
were seized in Belgium after it departed Guyana.27 The DEA’s 2020 National Drug Threat Assessment underscored that the largest quantity of cocaine seized and reported by the DEA
occurred at the U.S. Southwest border and the
Caribbean corridor.28

CLIMATE CHANGE AS A THREAT
MULTIPLIER IN THE CARIBBEAN
Conditions that are often conducive to security
risks are exacerbated by climate change. The
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) defines the
effects of climate change as a threat multiplier. In its 2014 Quadrennial Review, DOD asserts
that the impact of climate change “aggravates
stressors abroad such as poverty, environmental degradation, political instability, and social
tensions—conditions that can enable terrorist
activity and other forms of violence.”29 Contextualized to the Caribbean, the effects of climate
change are less about increases in terrorist activity and more about contributing to instability
in a relatively stable region, thus placing it into
cyclical or recurrent risk.
Although climate change is best described as
a threat multiplier in the Caribbean, it is equally important to understand the intersection of
climate change and security as a cyclical or
recurrent risk. Simply put, climate change contributes to limited access to social services and
public, private, and common goods for citizens.
Social services include access to education and
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healthcare, while public, private, and common
goods include clean air, water, food, and national defense. The loss of one or a combination of
these can lead to unemployment, poverty, displacement, and frustration. These conditions
increase security challenges, particularly in
the Caribbean, by incentivizing people to either
engage in criminal activity to regain access to
goods and services or increase their susceptibility to joining criminal groups and falling victim
to their operations. The cyclical nature of the
risk occurs because, as the loss of commodities and services increases, so do the effects
of climate change. Therefore, governments
must contend with addressing dual crises. The
impact of climate change exacerbates security
risks in the Caribbean, and governments that
devote resources to addressing security challenges limit their ability to recover and build
resilience against ongoing or future climate
change events.
Domestic challenges: At the state level, sudden and slow onset climate events have significant implications for security conditions in the
Caribbean, particularly in terms of governance
and state capacity. As a region in the Atlantic
Ocean, Caribbean states are vulnerable to frequent sudden onset events, such as hurricanes
and earthquakes, with one or both occurring
within days or weeks of one another. The most
recent example was the August 14, 2021, 7.2
earthquake that struck Haiti and Tropical Storm
Grace, which hit the country a few days later.30
This scenario is not uncommon, especially in the
summer months, when multiple tropical storms
or hurricanes can strike Caribbean countries.
This was the case in 2017, when the Caribbean suffered damages from Hurricanes Harvey,
Irma, and Maria.
The result is that Caribbean governments often
do not have the appropriate time or capacity
to address the aftermath of one sudden onset
event, much less two or three. Given the length
of time recovery takes, even back-to-back destructive hurricanes one year apart do not provide a government with sufficient recovery time.
In this scenario, at least three circumstances
can arise: social unrest, challenges to government legitimacy, and corruption. All three are
interconnected and can occur simultaneously. For instance, if government response time
slows or is deemed inefficient by the populace,
questions about government competency may

arise. After a period or multiple periods of citizen frustration, opposition groups can stage
rallies in defiance of an incumbent government,
or citizens might simply protest or riot due to
increasing resentment. This can result in quick
changes of power through either no-confidence
votes or leaders forced to step down. In the
aftermath of Hurricane Irma, this transpired in
Saint Maarten. Prime Minister William Marlin
lost two no-confidence votes after members of
Parliament argued that he mishandled recovery
efforts.31 Therefore, through quick successions
in leadership, instability is introduced into the
governance system.
Due to the two-party nature of Caribbean politics and increased natural disasters, this problem could occur more frequently in the future.
Incumbent and opposition parties often operate in zero-sum manners. Therefore, many issues in the Caribbean are polarized, as most
recently evidenced by the COVID-19 pandemic.
During the pandemic, border closures and vaccine hesitancy across the Caribbean culminated
in protests and often contributed to a politically
charged atmosphere. For instance, during anti-vaccine mandate demonstrations in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Prime Minister Ralph
Gonsalves was hit with a rock, causing bleeding
and a few days in the hospital.32 And as sudden
onset events grow in intensity and frequency,
limiting access to critical services and goods,
the same is likely to occur regarding climate
change. In the aftermath of Hurricane Maria in
neighboring Puerto Rico, former Governor Ricardo Rosselló resigned from office due to citizen
frustration over his mismanagement of recovery
efforts.33 The anger also drew upon discontent
about inequality in Puerto Rico, which is consistent with climate change as a threat multiplier. It
aggravated an existing stressor, and the combination of Rosselló’s mismanagement alongside
social cleavages led to a forced resignation.
With opposition groups looking for issues to
galvanize political mobilization, more protests
and riots will likely ensue in CARICOM countries.
The aftermath of climate events also creates
new opportunities for corruption. When devastating events like earthquakes and hurricanes strike the Caribbean, disaster aid is
usually administered by partner nations and
international humanitarian organizations. The
influx of cash, particularly to governments
with weak institutions, a history of corruption,
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high debt, and economic underdevelopment,
increases the chances of corruption. In the
Caribbean, there is a long history of democratic institutions, but their resilience is likely
to dwindle as they are regularly challenged by
the effects of climate change. And although
there has been measurable improvement regarding anti-corruption legislation in the region, implementation is a challenge.
After the 2010 earthquake, Haiti received
more than US$13 billion in disaster aid, but
there was little oversight by international actors and the Haitian government, leading to
calls of corruption and severe mismanagement. For CARICOM governments—particularly in Jamaica, Suriname, Guyana, and Trinidad
and Tobago—where the perception of corruption is high relative to Caribbean neighbors,34
climate change events will test their ability
to resist corrupt practices as more disaster
aid is distributed annually. Among CARICOM
members, more than half the population of
Trinidad and Tobago (85 percent), The Bahamas (80 percent), Jamaica (78 percent), Guyana (59 percent), and Barbados (53 percent)
considered corruption a “big problem.”35
As previously noted, the effects of climate
change increase the likelihood that ordinary
citizens lose access to social services and key
goods. Limited goods create competition among
the population, which can devolve into low-level conflict. The risk of this occurring today in the
Caribbean is small, but social and class cleavages in the region can cause security concerns
when there is competition for goods. First, due
to the two-party nature of Caribbean politics,
incumbents can prioritize their supporters (over
those that follow the opposition) to remain in
power. In countries where ethnic or racial tensions have existed, such as Guyana, Suriname,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Haiti, ethnically motivated political groups can use competition for
goods as a political mobilizer. In Guyana, for
instance, where agriculture is a primary economic sector, arable land is essential. However,
coastal and soil erosion increases the likelihood
of flooding and storm surges, effectively wiping out crops and future farming capacities. In
a country where ethnic mobilization is prevalent
during election cycles, one ethnically oriented
party can distribute land grants to one demographic over another to secure votes.
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Outside of governance challenges, the effects
of climate change in the Caribbean can increase
the legitimacy and membership of gangs. Climate change’s contribution to poverty and unemployment leaves people without the means
to acquire food, access clean water, and purchase clothing. Sudden onset events and degradation of natural beaches harm Jamaica’s
tourism economy, of which the island is heavily
dependent. Therefore, as more people are left
jobless and with limited prospects in the formal economy, people are likely to turn to illicit
means. For instance, a recent study of Jamaica
has linked poverty and unemployment to the
involvement and motivation of participation in
gangs.36 In countries such as Haiti, where gangs
are becoming increasingly political, they can increase their legitimacy among citizens without
access to goods, stripping governments of their
ability to corral citizens. As a legitimized force or
political actor, governments and security forces
will thus have more trouble combating gangs
or decreasing their membership. This might be
the case in Haiti soon; in the aftermath of the
2021 earthquake, gangs seized control of the
roads that led to badly hit areas.37 And while the
earthquake was not caused by climate change,
the tropical storm that followed—which are increasing in frequency due to rising temperatures—was related.
As part of the cyclical risk associated with climate change’s effects on security, increases
in crime have significant economic costs. The
Inter-American Development Bank said that
23 percent of Caribbean businesses reported
theft, arson, robbery, or vandalism in 2013-14,
higher than the global average of 19 percent.38
In the region, Guyana scored the highest at 33
percent, and the overall Caribbean reporting an
average loss of 2.6 percent of annual sales.39
Volatility and instability can deter foreign direct investment to the Caribbean, a leading
economic driver for development. At the same
time, violence and gang proliferation can increase emigration from Caribbean islands that
already have limited populations.40 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) noted that victims of
crimes are 30 percent more likely to emigrate
within three years of victimization. This implies
that with deterred foreign direct investment,
more people are impoverished, mirroring the
same conditions directly and indirectly created by climate change events, which becomes
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a motivator for joining gangs and transnational
criminal groups. And as more people leave the
country, governments lose out on much-needed
human capital essential to security forces and
government services. The result is a cycle that
continues to suppress economic growth, limiting the capability of governments to respond to
climate change.
Regional and international challenges: The
dependence on fisheries for export and food
consumption increases the security risk in the
Caribbean due to declining fishing populations.
As noted, the competition for goods creates
areas of conflict and social unrest. But declining fisheries presents a unique problem for the
Caribbean. As fisheries are compromised, more
people are likely to venture into other countries’
EEZs to find new schools of fish, which could
challenge relations between countries, with potential skirmishes arising between locals and
commercial fishers. In 2019, Surinamese authorities arrested five Guyanese for fishing in
Suriname’s EEZ.41 In 2021, French authorities
off the coast of French Guiana stopped a Venezuelan fishing vessel in its territorial waters with
illegally caught red snapper.42
Further, as fisheries become more scarce, Caribbean countries will have to contend with a
rise in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU). Besides jeopardizing food security
and losing revenue, IUU disproportionately affects poorer communities.43 The resulting loss
of livelihoods can increase displacement or lead
to poverty, making engaging in criminal activity more likely. In addition, IUU as a crime does
not occur in a vacuum; it is linked to additional
criminality, such as forged fishing licenses and
the simultaneous use of the vessels for drug
and arms trafficking.44
Both sudden and slow onset disasters contribute to displacement. Domestically, the loss of
agricultural jobs from environmental degradation and flooding in coastal towns forces citizens to migrate to urban centers. As rapid urbanization occurs, competition over goods and
living space can create small pockets of conflict
and increase common crime and violence. In
Haiti, where more than half the population lives
in cities, urbanization has coincided with high
crime and violence. And this is exacerbated after natural disasters. After the 2010 earthquake
in Haiti, crime rates increased 10 percent,45

and after the 2021 earthquake, media outlets
reported increases in gang activity in rural and
urban areas.
At the same time, displacement drives people
to migrate across borders. As noted, Caribbean
borders are not well guarded, making it easier
for people to jump from country to country, particularly for citizens in countries bordering Latin American neighbors (e.g., Guyana, Suriname,
and Belize). And on islands such as Haiti and
The Bahamas, which are close to U.S. shores,
citizens displaced after a hurricane or fatigued
over impoverished conditions could attempt
to migrate to the United States. The latest example is the massive outflow of migrants from
Haiti into the Western Hemisphere, including to
US borders. 46The outflow resulted, in part, due
to the combination of economic contraction,
increased gang presence and violence, and a
devastating earthquake. The combination of all
three, among additional internal and external
factors, has placed Haiti into its current pattern of cyclical risk. Haiti’s troubles provide an
insight for Caribbean countries in the medium
term. The indirect implication is forced migration. Vulnerable groups like women and children
will be most affected, as they are likely to fall
victim to organized crime activities, such as human trafficking.

A DUAL ROLE FOR CARIBBEAN
MILITARIES
As climate change increases security risks
in the Caribbean, its militaries will need to
adapt to a new, dual role. On the one hand,
as security risks are amplified, they will have
to contend with traditional challenges, such
as combating gang proliferation, social unrest, and other low-level forms of conflict. On
the other hand, Caribbean security forces will
need to continue to develop their Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR)
efforts. The need to expand both is costly, as
they require more personnel, trainings, equipment, and monetary resources.
Caribbean security forces will need to become
more involved in domestic affairs as security
conditions worsen due to climate change. Increased gang membership and the availability
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of guns, which rise due to the poverty caused
by climate change, will draw defense forces
into confrontation. In 2017, the Jamaican government deployed the Jamaican Defence Force
(JDF) into communities with high murder rates
due to gang presence.47 While homicide rates
dropped in the following years, they remained
high, setting a new tone for local gangs. The
JDF officers carry alternative weapons and are
trained differently than police forces, introducing a new level of combat to the community,
which, in turn, could spark more violent confrontations. The immediate risk is that civilians
are placed in harm’s way.
As sudden onset events become more frequent
and intense, Caribbean security forces will have
to adapt. Rather than only focus on addressing traditional security conflicts, disaster response and additional military-led humanitarian support will require increased attention. U.S.
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) leads HADR
efforts in the aftermath of natural disasters,
but Caribbean security forces will need to take
on more responsibility to increase response
times. Caribbean militaries will require a new
identity, relinquishing the traditional learned
roles instituted during the colonial era. This
new identity should be one equipped to deploy to disaster zones and aid in evacuations.
However, as noted, traditional security challenges will remain or even increase, meaning
that training to combat gangs and transnational
crime groups remains necessary.

THE GEOPOLITICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE AND SECURITY IN THE
CARIBBEAN
Caribbean countries depend on the international system and structure for their development
and remain small states engaged in asymmetrical relationships with wealthier, more powerful states, such as the United States and China.
Foreign policy decisions and loan agreements
are decided by considering how populations’
livelihoods are impacted; therefore, Caribbean
leaders take the best offer available. As Antigua
and Barbuda’s Prime Minister Gaston Browne
noted, the Caribbean is about “pragmatism,
about providing for our [Caribbean] people, and
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we [the Caribbean] are too small to have enemies.”48 This framing is essential to understand
how Caribbean governments have and will continue to make decisions regarding recovery
after sudden onset events and building future
climate resilience.
Alongside growing security challenges, significant financing is needed to build resilience and
recover after natural disasters. Since many Caribbean governments are cash-strapped and
already debt-burdened, they are hesitant to
incur additional debt by accepting more loans
from international financial institutions. The
COVID-19 pandemic only worsened this predicament, wiping out years of economic growth.
The result is that Caribbean leaders will look to
bilateral relationships for economic support.
Within this context, the effects of climate
change in the Caribbean will increase geopolitical complexities, including for the United
States. While Caribbean governments will turn
to the United States for support, China is an
additional option that frequently provides economic support to its diplomatic partners in the
region.49 Caribbean countries, specifically those
that will turn to alternative methods to address
energy interruptions that occur due to climate
change—such as solar, wind, and hydropower—might look to China for financing. Mechanisms at the World Bank and the IMF exist, but
the issue of debt remains a concern. Further,
China is committed to investing in renewable
energy in Latin America, which is extending to
the Caribbean. Several agreements have already been signed, specifically between China
and Barbados. In 2015, China began donating
solar units to Barbados,50 and in 2019, Prime
Minister Mia Mottley announced she signed an
agreement with China to purchase electric vehicle buses.51 And as the pandemic subsides
and Caribbean economies recover, many will
turn their attention to renewables as a method
of lowering the cost of electricity and lessening dependence on the global system. Only 10
percent of energy production presently comes
from renewable sources for subregions such as
the Eastern Caribbean.
Outside of renewable energy, China is a global
leader in providing assistance in the aftermath
of sudden onset events, and the Caribbean is
not excluded. After Hurricane Maria, China allocated almost US$18 million to Dominica.52 After
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Hurricane Irma, China launched the Post-Disaster Roof Restoration project that repaired 250
roofs in Barbuda, using new national building
code standards.53 Both efforts went a long way
toward each island’s recovery and, in Barbuda’s case, building resilience. In the aftermath
of Hurricane Elsa in 2021, China announced it
would donate 150 prefabricated homes to Barbados to help house displaced persons.54 Importantly, these efforts are framed as “SouthSouth” cooperation, a theme that resonates
deeply with the post-colonial Caribbean states.

Guaidó’s appointed representative to the institution and instead recognize that Maduro withdrew from the regional body in 2017.

Beyond China, other actors are likely to see
climate resilience and security conditions as
an opportunity to further their geopolitical interests in the Caribbean. On a smaller scale,
the Cuban and Venezuelan governments tend
to use disasters as an opportunity to build or
strengthen goodwill in the region. As a longtime
medical partner in the Caribbean, the Cuban
government routinely sends doctors when disaster strikes. The most recent example was in
the aftermath of the 2021 earthquake in Haiti.
After Hurricane Irma in 2017, Cuba sent more
than 750 medical professionals to six CARICOM
countries.55 The medical support is often reciprocated with diplomatic support, as CARICOM
members issue annual declarations condemning the U.S. embargo on Cuba and in defense of
the island.

•
Resilient recovery: How structures are
rebuilt and reinforced in the aftermath of sudden onset events or during slow onset ones is
critical to their resilience for the next disaster.
For instance, homes and government offices
that are destroyed must be rebuilt with climate
resilience in mind, using up-to-date building
codes and quality materials. U.S. private sector investment is needed. As the United States
focuses on building climate-resilient structures
at home, private sector companies should look
to the Caribbean for similar projects. Facilitating
investment to the region has the benefit of enhancing U.S.-Caribbean partnership in climate
change and deters the conditions that feed security challenges that ultimately affect U.S. national security.
•
Access to low-interest financing: U.S.
private sector investment is not the only channel to provide the financing Caribbean countries
require. International financial institutions such
as the World Bank and IMF can assist. However,
the challenge of incurring more debt deters Caribbean governments. Therefore, along with the
U.S. government and Caribbean leaders, these
financial institutions should expand low-interest assistance to the region, particularly members that often do not qualify for these loans
due to their high to middle-income status. This
would allow powerful financial institutions to
acknowledge that Caribbean countries are disproportionately vulnerable and more at risk for
underdevelopment due to the changing climate.
And an additional benefit for U.S. and Caribbean
interests is that by working within the multilateral system, the region’s governments can become less dependent on bilateral relationships.
They can use their collective clout to influence
loan agreements with these institutions, whether through high-level meetings or the Caribbean
Development Bank.

Venezuelan aid in the aftermath of disasters is substantially less than what is distributed by the Caribbean’s other partners in the
hemisphere, but it achieves a similar effect in
building goodwill and strengthening diplomatic
relations. Venezuela’s relations with CARICOM
members are diverse. Larger Caribbean economies, such as Trinidad and Tobago, and smaller
ones in the Eastern Caribbean, have supported
Maduro due to the benefits each gain from the
relationship. Natural resources for Trinidad and
Tobago border Venezuela’s maritime border,
making the latter a strategic partner. For Eastern Caribbean states with small populations,
limited aid from Venezuela still has a significant
impact on the livelihoods of Caribbean citizens.
After Irma, Venezuelan military planes flew water, food, and mattresses to affected Eastern
Caribbean islands,56 resulting in strengthened
goodwill between Caribbean islands and Venezuela, which is useful in multilateral forums.
In the Organization of American States, most
CARICOM members have yet to recognize Juan

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
There is a need for both short-term and longterm solutions to prevent or mitigate the cyclical or recurrent risk of the impact of climate
change on security challenges.
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•
Expand the regional security system:
While access to financing and investment can
help mitigate the effects of climate change that
amplify security risks, Caribbean governments
still need to address current and future challenges. First, this means expanding the scope
of CARICOM’s Regional Security System, which
is often a key component of HADR during the
aftermath of a natural disaster. Currently, its
membership extends to countries in the Eastern
Caribbean, but the rest of CARICOM is not part
of the group. Membership should be expanded
to include these countries, particularly because
the geographical diversity of the entire region
can aid in storing vessels, equipment, and personnel, all of which can increase response. For
instance, naval vessels housed in Guyana and
Suriname can assist in disaster response after hurricanes or help with evacuations alongside SOUTHCOM. Further, other countries could
more quickly deploy troops to disaster zones.
•
Enhanced military to military coordination: Enhanced U.S. and Caribbean military
coordination and cooperation are essential for
addressing current and forthcoming climate
security risks. SOUTHCOM houses humanitarian assistance and disaster response technical
expertise and personnel capacity, and Caribbean security forces have the indigenous understanding of their respective countries. The
latter is vital, specifically in terms of deploying
disaster assistance in remote or rough-terrain
areas. Indigenous information from Caribbean security forces can help SOUTHCOM tailor
training exercises to administer in the region. In
addition, due to the porous nature of Caribbean
borders, U.S. military support is needed to help
curb human, arms, and drug trafficking and the
eventual skirmishes that might arise along maritime borders once fisheries decline. As noted,
Caribbean militaries are facing a new, dual role.
SOUTHCOM can lend resources and expertise to
help Caribbean security personnel contend with
new challenges.
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